The network that cloned CEOs with AI and stole $129M: the federal indictment that changes corporate fraud
Direct answer
Federal prosecutors in Manhattan unsealed an indictment on November 5, 2026 against Jacob Soall, Sharon Hazan and Guy Sheetrit for using AI-cloned voices and images of real CEOs and lawyers to get company employees to wire about $129 million. The scheme, according to the indictment, ran from July 2024 to February 2026 and targeted thousands of companies around the world. Each defendant faces seven counts, including conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft and money laundering. These are allegations: the three men are presumed innocent unless proven guilty.
How the scheme worked, according to the indictment
- The boss's voice, cloned: according to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, the group posed as the companies' CEOs and as lawyers at major firms, with AI-cloned voices and, on some calls, video. The fake CEO called the employee and a fake lawyer took over to arrange the wire transfer, sometimes reading from a script.
- Six detailed losses add up to about $32 million: the indictment details $4,829,580 from a Missouri hospital system, $2,684,580 from a Rhode Island bank, $2,968,497 from a California hospital system, $11,578,474 from a UK financial technology company, $4,639,918 from a Massachusetts mutual fund company and $5,242,747 from a Florida pet food company. The rest of the alleged $129 million is not itemized in public reporting.
- One attempt failed because of the right control: Gizmodo, which read the indictment, reports an attempt to take about $2.85 million from a major New York investment bank in October 2024 that failed because the bank's back office stopped the wire. The control that defeated the attempt was verification through a separate channel, not the voice on the call.
- The money moved through nine countries: according to coverage, the group moved the money through accounts in at least nine countries before converting it to cryptocurrency. The indictment does not identify the AI models or deepfake services used.
The defendants and the state of the case
- Three defendants, arrested in Europe: Jacob Soall, 41, of Marbella, Spain, and the United Kingdom; Sharon Hazan, 54, of Israel; and Guy Sheetrit, 42, of Israel and the United Arab Emirates. Soall was arrested in Spain on June 17, 2026, Hazan in Spain on August 5, and Sheetrit in the United Kingdom on September 7. Extradition requests for all three are pending.
- Seven counts per defendant: conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, two counts of aggravated identity theft, money laundering conspiracy and two counts of money laundering. Wire fraud and money laundering carry up to 20 years each, and each identity theft count carries two years.
- The indictment is S3 26 Cr. 168: the superseding indictment was filed in the Southern District of New York. U.S. Attorney Jamie McDonald said AI technology offers tremendous potential, and that this case shows its use for fraud.
- The case is still unproven: none of what is alleged has been tested in court. There is no plea or verdict reported. The victim companies are not named in the release.
The protocol that protects your company
- Call back a number already on file: the boss's urgent transfer is verified by calling the number you already have saved for that person, never the number that arrives in the message or on the call. This control defeated the attempt against the New York bank.
- Two approvals for large transfers: no transfer above your threshold executes on a single voice. The second approval arrives through a different channel: an internal message, a call to a number on file, or an approval in the banking system.
- Urgency is the signal: the scheme used confidential transactions and urgent deadlines to bypass controls. A transfer that cannot wait for verification is a transfer that waits for verification.
- Train the team with this case: the case is real, with figures and a federal indictment. Use it in your next security session: listen to a cloned voice, practice the callback, and measure how many employees follow the protocol.
Note: this article summarizes the Department of Justice release of November 5, 2026 and coverage by CBS News, The Guardian, Gizmodo, Help Net Security, BankInfoSecurity and Biometric Update. All facts are allegations by prosecutors; the three defendants are presumed innocent. The indictment does not identify the AI models used.
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Frequently asked questions
What does the $129 million deepfake case allege?
The U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York charges Jacob Soall, Sharon Hazan and Guy Sheetrit with using AI-cloned voices and images of real CEOs and lawyers to get employees to wire about $129 million, between July 2024 and February 2026. Each faces seven counts, including wire fraud, aggravated identity theft and money laundering.
Has it been proven that the defendants are guilty?
The allegations have not been tested in court. The three defendants are presumed innocent unless proven guilty, and no plea or verdict has been reported.
How much was stolen in each detailed case?
The indictment details six losses totaling about $32 million: $11.6 million from a UK fintech, $4.8 million from a Missouri hospital, $5.2 million from a Florida company, $4.6 million from a Massachusetts fund company, $3.0 million from a California hospital and $2.7 million from a Rhode Island bank. The rest of the alleged $129 million is not itemized.
Which control stopped one fraud attempt?
An attempt to take about $2.85 million from a major New York investment bank in October 2024 failed because the bank's back office stopped the wire. The control that works is verification through a separate channel: calling back a number already on file.
